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ment ; or if reserved from the operation
of a conveyance, it must be in writing."
If the court by the language above
quoted meant to express an opinion
upon the point involved in the principal
case, such expression of opinion was a
mere dictum. It is possible that the
court may have had in mind when using
this language, not the question here in
issue, but only the question when a re-
servation of the crops in a deed is neces-
sary, and the bearing upon the question
of the Statute of Frauds. No adjudi-
cated case has been found sustaining the
position taken by the court in the prin-
cipal case, and the doctrine therein laid
down, while perhaps reasonable enough,
yet would seem to be a departure from
what has hitherto been regarded as the
law, and more proper to be declared by
the legislature than the courts.
MA sHALL D. EWEr .
Chicago, May 17th 1881.
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ACCOUNT.
Statute of Limitations does not run against each Item of open Mutual
Accounts.-Where there is an open, running, mutual account between
two persons, each person does not have a separate cause of action for
each separate item of the accounts: but only the person in whose favor
there is a balance due on the account has a cause of action for such
balance against the other. In such a case, the Statute of Limitations
does not run against each item separately; but only against the balance
due; and it will commence to run only from the time of making the
last item rightfully credited, to the party against whom the balance is
due; each item thus credited to the party against whom the balance is
due, is a payment or part payment, not of any particular item against
him, but of the balance due against him; and is, in one sense, a pay-
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1880. The cases will probably be reported in 13 Otto.
2 From Hon. John S. Runnells, Reporter; to appear in 54 Iowa Reports.
3 From A. M1. F. Randolph, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 25 Kansas Reports
4 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 14 of his Reports
5 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 13 Rhode Island Reports.
6 From Edwir F. Palmer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 53 Vermont Reports.
7 From Hon. 0. Af. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 52 Wis. Reports.
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ment or part payment of every item rightfully charged against him in
the whole account: Waffle v. Short, 25 Kans.
ACTION.
Payee may bring suit in his own name on Accepted Order.-W. gave
a written order to the plaintiff for all that was due him, on the defend-
ants, and it was accepted by them, by writing their names across the
same. Held, on demurrer, that the payee could maintain an action in
his own name, and recover of defendants whatever was due from them
to W.: Bacon v. Bates, 53 Vt.
The giving of the order by W.; receiving and presenting it for accept-
ance by the plaintiff, and accepting it by the defendants, under the
circumstances, completed a novation : Id.
When an order is given by one party, received and presented by
another, and accepted by a third, the agreement of each party is a suf-
ficient consideration for the agreement of every other party : id.
The negotiability of the order was restricted, being for an uncertain
amount; but this did not render it invalid, nor affect the payee's right
to enforce the same : id.
ACTS OF CONGRESS. See Errors and Appeals.
ADMIRALTY.
Limitation of Liability-Sect. 4283 Rev. Stat.- When claim may be
made-56th Admiralty Rule-How value of Vessel may be ascertained.-
The 56th Admiralty Rule does not preclude a party from claiming,
after the trial of the cause, the limitation of liability provided for by
sect. 4283 Revised Statutes : N. Y. & Wilmigton S. S. Co. v. Mount,
S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
But if such limitation is claimed after trial the matters adjudicated
cannot be reopened or the due course of appeal prevented : Id.
Where the claim is made during the progress of the cause it is in
the discretion of the court to require that evidence already taken shall
be received and used in the limitation proceedings: Id.
The claim would be ineffectual as against a party if made after he
had received satisfaction of his demand, but the omission to claim the
limitation as to one does not preclude the owners from claiming it as to
others suffering loss by the same collision : Td.
In certain cases of laches in making the claim, it ought not to be
allowed except upon condition of compensating the other party for
costs and expenses incurred by reason of the delay: Id.
The proper criterion of the owner's liability is not the value of the
vessel at the time of collision, but the amount at which she is ap-
praised or sold in the admiralty proceedings, or if surrendered, her
value at the time of surrender: Id.
ARBITRATION.
Arbitrator-Judicial Acts- Civil Liability for.-The acts of arbi-
trators, though irregularly done, in all matters to which their jurisdic-
tion extends, are performed in a judicial capacity; and an arbitrator
cannot be held liable in a civil action for damages, for an award alleged
to have been made by him fraudulently and corruptly: Jones v. Brown,
54 Iowa.
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An action for damages cannot be maintained against arbitrators, for
the filing of an award, after the order submitting the case to them has
been superseded, and in contempt of a writ of injunction served upon
them, such award being ineffectual for any purpose: Id.
ASSUMPSIT. See Partnership.
ATTACHMENT. See Uhited States Courts.
AUCTION.
Duty of Auctioneer to pay over Proceeds of Sale-Liabilty of Sure-
ties.-Paying over the proceeds of an auction sale to the person for whom
he sells, is one of the official duties of an auctioneer : Tripp v. Barton,
13 R. I.
Hence, neglect so to pay over, constitutes a breach of a bond condi-
tioned simply, that the auctioneer shall "well and faithfully perform all
the duties of said office during his continuance therein :" Id.
An official bond need not follow the words of the statute, if it uses
words of the same legal effect: Id.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See Errors and Appeals.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Witness.
BOND. See Auction.
CONFLICT oF LAws.
Xote made by Husband and Wife in another State.-A. and B. his
wife, made and delivered their negotiable promissory note to the plain-
tiff. The note was made in Massachusetts, where the parties resided,
and was valid there. Suit on this note was brought in Rhode Island,
the writ being served, on the husband by attaching his interest in the
realty of his wife, on the wife by attaching her realty, and on both, by
attaching the wife's share of an intestate estate in the hands of an
administrator. Pending the suit, the husband was adjudged a bankrupt
and subsequently died.' Held, that the wife being legally incapable in
Rhode Island to make a promissory note, the action against her could
not be maintained. Held, further, that as in Rhode Island the
husband must be made co-defendant with the wife, and there was in
this case no service of the writ on the husband, the action was fatally
defective: Hayden v. Stone, 13 R. I.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Members of Congress-Freedom of Speech and Debate-Extent of
Exemptionfrom Liability.-The exemption of members of Congress from
liability for speech or debate, extends to the report of members of a
committee in favor of punishing a witness for contempt; their expres-
sion of opinion that he was in contempt, and their vote as members of
the house in favor of his imprisonment. Such exemption is a good
defence in an action brought against them by the person imprisoned:
Kilbourn v. Thompson, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
Expostfacto.-A statute which purports to authorize the prosecu-
tion, trial and punishment of a person for an offence previously com-
622 ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
mitted, and as to which all prosecution, trial and punishment were, at
its passage, already barred according to pre-existing Statutes of Limita-
tion, is unconstitutional and void: Moore v. State, 14 Vroom.
CONTEMPT.
Houses of Congress-Extent of Power to Punish for Contempt-
Orders of, not conclsive.-The two houses of Congress do not possess
the same general power of punishing for contempt, that is exercised by
the houses of the English Parliament: Kilbourn v. Thonpson, S. 0.
U. S. Oct. Term 1880.
Whether a power of punishing for contempt exists, as necessary to
enable them to exercise their legislative functions, qnure? ld.
No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness befbre either
house, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which the house
has jurisdiction to inquire: -d.
In a suit for false imprisonment, where the defendant justifies under
the process of either house of Congress, the resolution of such house and
the warrant of its speaker are not conclusive, but its authority may be
inquired into by the court : Id.
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheaton 204, overruled: Id.
CONTRACT. See Frauds, Statute of.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Evidence.
Cofession -Confession in a legal sense is, in effect, an admission of
something which proves, or tends to prove, that the party making it
was himself connected with the alleged crime, in a criminal or question-
able manner; hence, admissions which tend to criminate a third party,
are not within the rules of law, that exclude confessions, induced by
promises and hope of favor: State v. Carr, 53 Vt.
DAMAGES. See Aregligence; Rep levin.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Husband and Wife; Sale.
DEED.
Boundaries and Monuments.-In locating lands described in a con-
veyance, the fixed monuments are more to be relied on than the descrip-
tion of the courses and distances: Kalbfteisch v. Standard Oil Co., 14
Vroom.
The fact that the government has established a fixed standard by
which distances are to be measured, cannot affect this legal rule : Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See Receiver.
Reference of Case to Referee in Circuit Court under State Practice-
Doubt as to Right of Supreme Court to Review-Conclusiveness of Find-
ing of Referee as to Facts-Presumption of Filing of Wiitten Stipulation
of Waiver of Jury-Bill of Exceptions-Except ion to Overriling of a
NArumber of Objections as a Whole-Acts of Congress of 1865 and 1872.-
It is doubtful whether cases tried in the Circuit Courts by a referee
in states where such a practice exists, can be reviewed in the Supreme
Court. While under the Act of 1872 (Rev. Stat. 914) the practice
in the Circuit Court must conform to that in the state courts, yet the
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
review of a case in the Supreme Court is regulated by the Acts of Con-
gress and not by the laws of the state, and Congress has not provided
for the review of cases decided by a referee: Boogher v. New York
Life Insurance Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
Treating such a case, however, as if the trial before the referee was
a trial by the court without a jury, the facts found by the referee and
confirmed by the court, must be treated as conclusive and will not be
reviewed : Id.
Although the record does not show the written stipulation of the
waiver of a jury required by the Act of 1865 (Rev. Stat. 649, 700), yet
if it appears that under the state practice the case could not have been
referred without the written consent of the parties, the Appellate Court
will assume that a written stipulation was filed: Id.
Where the exceptions to a referee's report are overruled as a whole,
and one exception is taken to the action of the court overruling them,
this exception will not be sustained if any one of the findings of the
referee excepted to was correct: Id.
ESTOPPEL. See Negotiable Instruments.
EVIDENCE. See Negligence.
Admissions-Efect of in dispensing with Proof.-The admission, by
a party to a suit, of the existence of an assessment under the provisions
of a municipal charter authorizing such an assessment under certaiu
circumstances and for certain purposes, will render unnecessary proof
of the jurisdiction of the municipal corporation to make the assess-
ment, or proof of its regularity: Tarrell v. City of Elizabeth, 14 Vroom.
A plaintiff, whose success depends on the admission of evidence
offered by defendant and which plaintiff does not except to, and who
does not suffer a nonsuit, cannot complain that the court has made use
of that evidence so far as it was favorable to defendant: 1d.
Res gestse-Declarations after tLe Occurrenc.-W. alleged that P.
assaulted him, while alone in his own house, with a musket, with in-
tent to kill and rob him. P. was duly informed against, and on the
trial of the criminal action the court admitted, over the objections of
P., the declaration of W., made in the absence of P., three to five
minutes after the transaction, to witnesses who ran to his assistance on
hearing his cries of murder, that P. made an assault with a musket at
the window, demanded his money, together with the words and acts of
each other. Held, The declarations of W. were merely hearsay and
therefore inadmissible: State v. Pomeroy, 25 Kans.
FRAUD. See Sale.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Parol Conveyance of Lands-Suit to Recover Consideration Paid-
Right of Rescission-Tender.-H., knowing that certain lands were part
of the estate of one T., deceased, and did not belong to F., who was the
administrator of such estate, gave his note to F. for $500 ; and took
from F., as such administrator, a receipt for the note, which further stated
that such note, if paid, was to be in full payment of the purchase-money
of said lands; and that a deed of them was to be made to H. or his
assigns, as soon as leave could be obtained from the probate court; and
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afterwards, he paid the note and cut from the lands the timber thereon,
constituting a large part of their value. Some of T.'s heirs refused to
join in a conveyance of the lands to H.; and the estate of T. was not
settled when this action was brought. Without offering to rescind the
contract, or surrender possession of the land, or pay the value of the
timber taken therefrom, and without any demand and refusal of a con-
veyance, H. sues to recover the moneys so paid, as for a failure of the
consideration : Held, that the action will not lie: Hysli4 v. French, 52
Wis.
GUARANTEE.
When conditional must be Accepted and Guarantor notified of Ac
ceptance.-A guaranty in the following terms, addressed to A.: "If
H. contracts with you for lime and plaster to be used in court-house
buildings in Providence, promising to pay your bills from moneys re-
ceived by him for work done on said buildings, I will guarantee the
faithful performance of such contract with you. J. G-. B." is condi-
tional, and B. was entitled to notice that the conditions were accepted:
King v. Batterson, 13 R. I.
If the lime and plaster were in fact furnished, not by A. but by the
plaintiffs K.. the latter could not hold B. on his guaranty offered to A.
nor could they maintain their action on the ground that A. was their
agent: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Conflict of Laws.
Ante-nuptial Agreement- Conveyance in Consideration of Marriage.-
Rights of Oreditor.-Marriage is in law a valuable consideration. In
consideration of marriage a man may convey property to his intended
wife, and this conveyance, if bona fide and of a reasonable amount
of property, is good against both existing and subsequent creditors:
Nat. Ex. Bank v. Watson, 13 R. I.
For an ante-nuptial settlement to be void as fraudulent upon the set-
tlor's creditors both parties to the settlement must have been cognisant
of the intended fraud: Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Liability of Tenant for Rent after Destruction by Fire-Rle where
Real and Personal Property leased together.-Whether the doctrine of
the common law, that, upon a covenant to pay rent in a lease of lands
and buildings for a term of years, the rent may be recovered notwith-
standing the total destruction by accidental fire of the buildings, is in
force in this state, quoere? Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kans.
Even if this common-law doctrine be in force, yet where by a single
instrument real and personal property are leased for a gross rental, and
the personalty is a substantial part of the leased property, upon a total
destruction by accidental fire, the lessee is entitled to an abatement of
the rent equal to the proportionate rental value of the personalty: Id.
Where a lease for a term of years in addition to a covenant to pay
rent, contains a stipulation that the lessee shall insure all or a part of
the leased property in a given amount for the benefit of the lessor, held,
that the provision for insurance limits and qualifies the promise to pay
rent, and that as the former becomes operative the latter ceases to have
force: Id.
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LiMI-fATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Account.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Justification under Civil Process- Want of Jurisdiction in Officer
issuing Process.-In an action for false imprisonment the defendants
justified by filing an answer, stating that the imprisonment for which
the plaintiff brought his action was had under and by virtue of an
order of arrest issued in a civil action by a justice of the peace. The
defendants set forth in their answer a copy of the affidavit upon which
the order of arrest was issued, and from this copy it appears that the
affidavit did not state any one of the grounds required by the statute
to be stated in an affidavit for an order of arrest; held, that the justifi-
cation was not sufficient; that an affidavit for an order of arrest is
jurisdictional in its character, and that where it does not state any one
of the grounds required by the statute to be stated in an affidavit for an
order of arrest, all proceedings afterward had under it, or by virtue
thereof, or which are founded thereon, are void: Hauss v. Kohlar,
25 Kans.
MANDAMUS.
To Cbmpel Levy of Tax-Dispute as to Validity of Debt.-On the
hearing of an order to show cause why a peremptory mandamus should
not issue in this case, to enforce the levy and collection of a tax to pay
interest upon bonds of a city, the validity of the bonds was questioned
by the city, and various questions, both of law and of material facts
affecting their validity, were raised. Held, that it was error to grant
the writ before the relator had established his right in an ordinary
action at law: State of Wisconsin ex rel. Pfister v. Mayor and Board
of Aldermen of the City of Manitowoc, 52 Wis.
MORTGAGE.
Foreclosure-Suit-Incumbrancer pendente lite-ot a Necessary
Party.-Where pending a foreclosure-suit another creditor of the
mortgagor brings suit and obtains a judgment, which is a lien on the
equity of redemption, the mortgagee is not bound to make such creditor
a party in order to cut off his interest, even though by operation of
law the lien of the judgment bound the land from the first day of term
at which the judgment was rendered, which day was prior to the com-
mencement of the foreclosure prodeedings. In such case the judgment-
creditor is bound by the decree of foreclosure: Stout v. Lye, S. C. U.
S., Oct. Term 1880.
MUNICIPAL CO1PORATION. See Mandamus.
Taxation-Limit of-Judgment Debt-Construction of Charter.-
A section of a city's charter provided that the city council should have
power to levy taxes not exceeding one and one-half per cent. per annum
of the taxable property. Another section empowered the courts, upon
failure of the council to make provision for a debt, to make sueh decrees
as might be necessary for levying taxes not exceeding one per cent. per
annum until the debt was paid. Held, that the former section related
only to the ordinary tax for the necessities of the city, and that notwith-
standing the limit imposed by this section had been reached the courts
could under the latter section decree the levy of a tax to pay a judg-
VOL. XXIX.-79
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ment debt: City of Louisiana v. United States, ex rel. Wood, S. C. U.
S., Oct. Term 1880.
N:EGLIGENCE.
Leaving Horse unfastened-Hirer's Liability for Injuries to Horse-Damages__EvidenceC-EXi~erts.-In action to recover damages of the
hirer of a horse on account of negligence, the jury returned a general
verdict against the defendant and found specially, that he was guilty
of negligence in the care and management of the horse hired by him
that the horse was a safe one, but that he was notified by the plaintiff
when he hired him that he was unsafe, and that his negligence con-
sisted in his not having hold of the lines when he attempted to get
into the buggy. Held, The case was properly committed to the decision
of the jury, and the Supreme Court cannot say, under the circum
stances, as a matter of law, that the defendant was not negligent: Mon
roe v. Lattin, 25 Kans.
It is the general rule, that witnesses must speak to facts, and that
they are not allowed to give opinions, unless they are experts, and then
only upon questions of science and skill: Id.
It is inadmissible to ask a witness as to his opinion, whether it would
be negligence for the driver to leave a horse unhitched just long enough
for him to get into the buggy, if the lines were upon the same side of
the horse the driver intended to get in : Id.
An instruction that the damage to the buggy and harness would be
the difference in the value of the property before the injury and 
after
the repairs, with the reasonable cost of the repairs and value of 
use
during repairs, provided, the damages did not exceed the value of 
the
property, lays down a fair mode of measuring the damages. So, also,
the difference in the value of a horse, injured by the negligence 
of
another, before and after reasonable treatment for such injury, with 
the
expense of the treatment and attendance, and value of the use of 
the
animal during the treatment, all not to exceed the value of the animal,
would furnish one rule for assessment of the damages sustained 
by the
injury: Id.
Contributory Negligence- Case for the Jury.-Plaintiff went to 
de-
fendant's railway station for the purpose of helping to carry 
a trunk
for a friend, who was about to take passage on one of defendant's 
trains.
Having bought a ticket, plaintiff and his friend took the trunk 
to a
platform pointed out by the ticket agent. There was at that 
time no
train in sight, but one was due and expected to arrive at any 
moment.
The view of the track was unobstructed as far as the bridge 
about
four hundred yards distant in the direction from which the 
train was
to come. Plaintiff and his friend, carrying the trunk between them,
were walking in the other, direction along the platform when 
plaintiff
was suddenly struck from behind and severely injured by the bumper
of the engine drawing the expected train. The bumper projected 
eigh-
teen inches over the platform, which was from five to eight feet 
wide.
There were a number of other persons on the platform. The testimony
was conflicting as to whether bell was rung or whistle sounded 
after
the train passed through the bridge; but it tended to show that 
the
grade from the bridge to the platform was an up-grade; that the engine
was being run at an unusual rate of speed; that the engineer, 
after
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crossin the bridge, saw the persons on the platfbrm ; that he saw plain-
tiff before he was struck, sounded the alarm-whistle and reversed the
engine, but the brakes were not put down ; that after being struck,
plaintiff was carried about eight feet, when the engine stopped. Held,
that on this testimony the trial court was warranted in submitting to
the jury the question whether plaintiff was injured by his own fault
or that of defendant: Langan v. St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern
Railway Co., 72 Mo.
Negligence is not imputable to a person for failing to look out for
danger when under the surrounding circumstances he had no reason to
suspect any: Id.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
What not- County Warrants-Set-off-Estoppel.-A county warrant
drawn by the clerk upon the treasurer, directing the latter to pay to the
payee therein named a certain sum of money, is not a negotiable instru-
ment, and the county may set-off against a bona fide purchaser for value
a claim held by it against the payee: Wall v. Monroe Co., S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1880.
Nor is the county estopped in such case by the fact that the warrant
is a re-issue to the payee in lieu of an original warrant surrendered by
him, and that at the time of such re-issue the claim now set up as a
defence was known to exist: Id.
NOTICE.
Party put on Inquiry must Inquire in proper Direction, and use due
Diligence.-The record of a mortgage, with a general description of the
indebtedness, is constructive notice ; and sufficient to put all parties
interested upon inquiry; and they must inquire in the proper quarter:
Passumpsic Savings Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 53 Vt.
When one is put on inquiry, he is chargeable with notice of all facts
that could be obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence, prose-
cuting the inquiry in the right direction: Id.
But while this is so, and while a liberal rule has been adopted to give
effect to such mortgages, from the necessity of the case, there must be
some limit to the inquiry, which one is bound to make; and that limit
is reasonable diligence: Id.
Courts have not attempted to lay down a general rule as to what
would constitute reasonable inquiry. This must vary with the circum-
stances of each case; Id.
This mortgage was given to a retiring partner, to secure him against
the liabilities of the partnership; and also for the "balance which
should be due him on the purchase of said property." Notes were
given to the mortgagee, but were not described, except as above. The
note in question was assigned to the orator. The company was composed
of three members; one living in Connecticut, one in California, and the
managing partner in this state. The defendant examined the records:
and inquired of both the mortgagee and mortgagor (that is the one
partner in this state) whether anything was due to the mortgagee for
the purchase money, and was informed by both that it "was all paid; "
and then took its mortgage. Held, that the second mortgage should
prevail over the first : Id.
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NUISANCE.
Liability for.-All persons who are concerned, 
directly or indirectly,
in a public nuisance, such as the firing 
off of fireworks in a public
street, are responsible for the injuries done 
to an innocent person:
Jenne v. Sutton, 14 Vroom.
OsFcER. See Replevin.
PARTNERSHIP.
Assumpsit does not lie for Balance before Account 
Stated.-A. brought
assunipsit against B., his former partner, for 
the balance of a 6opartner-
ship account. The declaration did not allege 
an account stated, nor
show that the firm debts had been fully paid 
and the firm property re-
duced to money. Held, on demurrer, that 
the action could not be
maintained: Dowling v. Clarke, 13 R. I.
RAILROAD.
Receiver-Lien Holders not Parties.-The 
plaintiff filed a statement
for a mechanic's lien upon a railroad; 
subsequently an action was
brought against the railroad company by 
certain creditors in which a
receiver was appointed to take charge of the property, 
and afterward,
in the same action, certain indebtedness 
created by the receiver was
declared a first lien upon the road, which 
was sold in payment thereof.
Held, that the plaintiff was not represented 
in his character as a lien
holder by the receiver, and that, not having 
been made a party to the
action at any time, his lien was not 
divested by the sale: Snow v. Wins-
low et al., 54 Iowa.
The receiver having been authorized 
by the court to build a con-
siderable extension of the road, and in payment 
therefor to issue cer-
tificates which should be a first lien upon 
the entire line, it was held
that, in the absence of a showing of some 
peculiar exigency which
rendered the extension necessary to protect 
the rights of the parties in
interest, the lien of the plaintiff would not 
be displaced by the indebted-
ness so created: Id.
Stacking Hay near Track.-Question of 
Contributory Negligence.-
A person stacked his hay in a meadow 
one hundred and fifty to two
hundred yards from a railroad track, and 
the sparks from a passing en-
gine ignited the grass fifty-six feet from 
the track, and there was no
obstacle to prevent the fire from reaching the hay 
through the dry grass,
and nothing had been done to prevent it, 
and the hay was burned, and
ciestroyed by the spreading of the fire, 
Held, whether the owner thereof
was guilty of contributory negligence 
or not was a question of fact for
the jury and not a question of law for the 
court to decide : C. .E. S.
& G. Railroad Co. v. Owen, 25 Kans.
RECEIvER. See Railroad.
Appeal by.-Leave of Court.-The allowance 
by the circuit justice
of the appeal of a receiver is equivalent 
to leave by the court to the
receiver to take the appeal: Farlow 
v. Kelly, S. 0. U. S. October
Term 1880.
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REPLEVIN.
Claim by Third Party-Protection of Writ to Officer.-In Rhode
Island an officer holding a writ of replevin with the statutory bond will
be protected in taking the property described from the defendant in the
writ, and in delivering it to the plaintiff, notwithstanding third parties
may claim the property. A. purchased certain personalty of B., mort-
gaged it to B., and kept it in a house occupied by himself. During the
absence of A., the house was sold under a mortgage, and with the per-
sonalty passed into the possession of 0. A. replevied the personalty
from C., but while the officer was making an inventory of the person-
alty to deliver it under the writ to A., B. demanded it. B. had not
been in possession of the personalty since its purchase by A., nor was
C. au agent of B. The officer refused to comply with B.'s demand
whereupon B. brought trover against A. and the officer. Held, that the
action would not lie against the officer: Curry v. Johnson, 13 R. 1.
Recovery on Bond-Aleasure of Damages.-Where grain taken on a
writ of replevin was threshed and sold by the plaintiff, and upon the
trial the ownership was found to be in the defendant, the measure, of
his recovery on plaintiff's bond was held to be the market value of the
grain at the time of the trial, less the cost of threshing and marketing,
it not appearing that the plaintiff had acted in bad faith in obtaining
the writ: Clement v. Duffy, 54 Iowa.
SALE.
Conditional and Certain Payments-Failure of Vendee to Pay-
Resumption of Possession by Vendor.-Where W. sells to F. a safe on
credit, upon the condition that the title to the safe shall remain in W.
until it shall be entirely paid for, and F. is to take possession of the
safe, but if at any time he makes default in any payment. W. is then
entitled to retake the possession of the safe, and F., after making one or
two payments thereon, makes default in all other payments. Held, that
W. is entitled on demand to retake the possession of the property, with-
out payment, or tendering back any portion of the amount which F.
has paid to W.: Fleck v. Warnei, 25 Kans.
Change of Possession-Debtor and Credtor-Fraud in Law-Pro-
ceedings in Bankruptcy not a Judicial Sale-Damages.-A sale is fraudu-
lent in law, unless there is a change of possession; possession in the
vendee, open, notorious and exclusive, that is, apparent and such as
would indicate to an observer a change of ownership, exclusive, not
joint; and if any of these requisites are wanting to the sale, the property
is liable to attachment by the creditors of the vendor, notwithstanding
the bona fides of the transaction : Weeks'v. Prescott, 53 Vt.
When the purchaser of personal property acquires the title to the
land on which it is situated, it is not necessary to remove it; but when
he permits the vendor to remain upon the premises, and control the
property, his title, and the notice given by the record, are insufficient to
change the rule: Id.
During the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings, the creditors ac-
cepted the proposition of compromise, under the United States statute of
1874. and the property was sold by the owner by leave or order of court.
Held, that it was not a judiciat sale, and that the rule as to a change of
possession applied: Id.
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Here were two sales : 1st, from the vendor to his brother, and then
by the vendee to a son of the vendor. The first sale was fraudulent 
in
law; the second, both in law and in fact. Held, that the second vendee.
took only the rights of the first: Id.
It was a sale of an entire stock of goods commonly kept 
in a country
store. The vendor remained in possession as agent of 
the vendee, sell-
ing and replenishing the stock with the avails of what was 
sold. Held,
that the goods remaining of those originally purchased by the 
first ven-
dee, were attachable; but those replaced, were not attachable 
on the
debts of the vendor. A different rule would probably prevail, 
where
the sale is fraudulent in fact: Id.
Taking a lease of the store in which the goods were situated, 
and hav-
ing it recorded; the transfer of the policy of insurance 
to the vendee;
opening new books of account; buying and having goods 
sent in the
name of the vendee-these are facts that tend to show 
a sufficient pos-
session. But, in the opinion of the court, they are outweighed 
by the
facts, that the vendor continued in the control and management 
of the
goods, apparently as before the sale; that the vendee 
continued to board
in his father's (vendor's) family as before; that the goods 
remained in
the same store, and that to a common observer the apparent 
possession
did not indicate a different possession : Id.
SEDUCTION.
Right of Father to Recover.-A father may recover for loss 
of ser-
vice of his infant daughter caused by her being gotten 
with an illegiti-
mate child, notwithstanding she was not at the time 
actually in the
service of the father (but in that of the defendant), 
if he still retained
the legal right to reclaim such service: Lavery v. Crooke, 
52 Wis.
While the cause of action in such a case is technically 
the loss of
service, the jury are not confined to the actual pecuniary 
loss, but may
award exemplary or punitory damages; and evidence 
is admissible to
show the defendant's pecuniary condition: Id.
It is no objection to the maintenance of an action for 
seducing the
plaintiff's daughter that defendant procured the sexual 
intercourse by
force: Id.
TAXATION. See Municipal Corporation.
Tax Title-Evidence of Validity depends on Strict Compliance 
with
Statutory Powers.-In New Jersey on certiorari brought 
in aid of an
ejectment to review the proceedings on which a tax title 
is founded, the
recitals in the certificate of sale are primafacie 
evidence of the facts
recited: Woodbridge v. State, 14 Yroom.
The act relative to sales does not affect the title derived 
by virtue of
the deed; it only changes the rule of evidence as to the 
manner of prov-
ing the facts required to constitute a valid sale. Consequently, 
on the
hearing of a certiorari brought to review the proceedings 
on which a
tax title is founded, the common-law rule applies that 
one who claims
title under a tax sale, must show affirmatively, that 
the tax was duly
assessed, and was a lien on the lands; and that the 
successive steps
which led to the sale, were regularly taken. Such facts, 
if they do not
appear by the proceedings returned with the writ, must 
be shown by the
recitals in the certificate of sale or by proof aliunde : 
Id.
The power to sell lands for taxes is a naked power, and 
the validity
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of the title derived from such a sale, depends upon a strict compliance
with the directions of the statute. The onusprobandi is upon the pur-
chaser at such a sale; and he must show affirmatively, that everything
has been done which the statute makes essential to the due execution of
the power: Id.
Where the statute gives the power to sell to a particular officer, as,
for instance, the chairman of the township committee, it must appear
that the sale was in fact made by him, and at the time and place at
which the sale was advertised to be made: Id.
UNITED STATES COURTS.
Suits against Non-residents- When Prohibited-Attachments-Sect.
739, Rev. Stat.-The prohibition of section 739, revised statutes, against
the bringing of a suit in a Circuit Court, in any other state than that
of which defendant is an inhabitant, or in which he is found at the time
of serving the writ, applies to an attachment against defendant's pro.
perty : Ex parte Des Moines & Minneapolis Railroad Co., S. C. U. S..
Oct. Term 1880.
The act dividing the district of Iowa into four divisions, and provid-
ing, that where defendant is not a resident of the district, suit may be
brought in any division where his property may be found, applies only
to suits which may be properly brought against a non-resident, such as
local suits, and suits where the defendant is found in the division when
served with process: Id.
UsuRY.
When may be recovered back.-Usury paid on a note, not included
in it, nor endorsed on it, may be recovered back by the payer, although
the note has passed into a judgment; and a plea setting up such faicts
is held insufficient on demurrer: McDonald v. Smith, 53 Vt.
And this is so, while it is true, as decided in Day v. Cummings, 19
Vt. 496, that, when the usury is included in the note, and judgment
has been rendered on it, it cannot be recovered back : Id.
The party paying the usury can plead it in offset; but his neglect todo so, is no bar to his recovering it in an independent suit: .1d.
Where usury has been paid on a mortgage note, and the mortgage
has been foreclosed, and the usury was deducted on the making of the
decree, although this was done at the instance of an attaching creditor,
while the payer of the usury (the plaintiff in this suit) protested against
such deduction, such usury cannot be recovered; and a plea alleging
such facts, on demurrer, is held sufficient: Id.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
Running Stream-Action for Disturbing a Water Right.-Where an
action is brought for diverting the sources of a running stream, which
are on the land of a third party, who allowed the defendant to lay an
aqueduct to them, the court charged the jury. "That if there was a
brook, that had been accustomed to flow from the swamps on the land
of Rice, through or upon the lands of others, and such brook was in
character, permanent and constant, in usual and ordinary seasons, then
Rice had no right to divert the water from such stream, or diminish
the quantity of water accustomed to run in the channel of such stream,
except such as might be incident to the proper husbandry of such farm.
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But if the swamp or marsh on Rice's land was made by water oozing
from the surrounding hills, which generally was wholly absorbed by the
marsh, and that water only flowed from the basin or marsh, in times of
excessive rains, or melting snow, then the plaintiffs would have no right
of action against Rice, or -those acting under him, for draining the
water from the swamp in any proper manner, and would have no claim
for nowinal damages." Held, no error: Boynton v. Gilman, 63 Vt.
Subterranean Waters-Right to Use is Subject to Restriction not to
Inteifere with .atural Siurface S-tream.-S. is the owner of certain mills
built on his own land on the banks of the Cottonwood. These mills are
propelled exclusively by water-power obtained by means of a dam across
the river. S. purchased in 1860 the right of flowage of the upper
riparian owner, built the dam on his own lands, and has been in quiet
and undisturbed possession for nineteen years. In this property he
has invested many thousands of dollars. In 1880, the city of Emporia
constructed a system of waterworks for the purpose of supplying the
citizens with water for domestic use, for extinguishing fires, and for
manufacturing purposes. It purchased a tract of land on the banks
of the pond above the dam, dug a well twenty-five feet in diameter and
twenty-six feet deep on its own land, and from seventy-five to a hundred
feet from the bank of the pond. This well draws its supply of water
from the pond by percolation through a bed of gravel at the bottom
of the well. It sank one pipe into the well and another it extended
directly into the pond. By means of engines and pumps it supplies
the citizens from the well with all water needed for ordinary purposes,
and intends to use the pipe in the pond only in case of fire. No cam-
demnation of the water was had, and no compensation made to S. The
supply of water in the river is at certain seasons of the year inadequate
for the running of the mills, and S. is then forced to suspend work and
let them stand idle. Eield, that S. is entitled to an injunction restrain-
ing the city from taking water from the pond, either directly through
the pipe extending into it, or indirectly by means of the well: City of
Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kans.
While the general doctrine in respect to underground water percola-
ting through the soil is unquestionably that the owner of the land may
appropriate it to any use and in any amount, and without reference to
the effect of such appropriation upon his neighbor's land or supply of
water, yet it is limited to this extent that he may not thus indirectly
destroy or diminish the flow of a natural surface stream to the injury
of a riparian owner thereof: Id.
WITNESS.
Arote-Payer not Competent after Death of Payee.-The payer of a
negotiable note is not a witness-to the fict of a payment, the note having
been assigned subsequently, the payee being dead, and suit brought in
the name of the assignee: Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wells, 63 Vt.
When one party to a contract is dead, and the contract has been
assigned, so that the estate, or heirs, have no interest in it, the assignee
stands upon the proviso of s. 24, c. 36, Gen. Sts., in all cases where
the contract is the cause of action, in issue and on trial, and the sur-
vivor cannot testify-otherwise where the contract is a matter collateral
to the cause of action : Id.
